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We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. 
Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. 
a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. 
When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive 
infinite number of times. 
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Abstract
We propose a simple inﬁnite horizon of repeated elections with two can-
didates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some
degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy
implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough,
no party can win the election a consecutive inﬁnite number of times.
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1 Introduction
In modern democracies, the alternation of political parties in power is a fre-
quent phenomenon. Why isn’t there a greater persistence of parties in power
? How can one explain the turnover of parties in government ? How can one
explain political cycles ? In a dynamic setting, we introduce two imperfec-
tions to the model of Downs (1957). As other scholars (see Casamatta and De
Donder (2005)), we consider a programs inertia assumption. As Heckelman
(2000), we consider that parties have (diﬀerent) ﬁxed programs. The second,
we call policy inertia represents imperfections in changing the government
policy. This eﬀect has various origins in real political life. Indeed, a majority
of policies can not be changed without a cost. To modelize this stylized fact,
we distinguish eﬀective policy, which is the objective state of the policy, and
the government policy, which is the policy of the incumbent during his legis-
lature. We suppose that the eﬀective policy at time t is a convex combination
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1of the eﬀective policy at date t−1 (past policy) and of the government policy
at time t. This says that the government can not freely change completely
the policy implemented in the past. We argue that is a reason why similar
countries with diﬀerent histories implement very diﬀerent policies. We says
that the model exhibits political cycles when no party can win the election
a consecutive inﬁnite number of times. That is parties indeﬁnitely alternate
(not necessary regularly) in power.
The main result states that if policy inertia is high enough, political cycles
appear. Furthermore, we show that the dynamic can be history dependent.
Indeed, if in an election, the median voter is indiﬀerent between the two pro-
grams, the future dynamic will be dramatically aﬀected. Scholars generally
explain political cycles with psychological arguments (see Goertzel (2005)
for a review of the American voters mood changes literature). Schlesinger
(1949, 1986, 1992) consider that the electorate is inevitably disappointed by
the party or the ideology that is in power. Klinberg (1952) suggests that
American mood in public opinion balances between introversion and extro-
version. This could explain why domestic and foreign concerns alternate
through time and parties turnover in power. The main explanation is cer-
tainly disappointment. The “Negativity eﬀect” theory (see Aragones (1997)
for a survey) is built on the following remark: voters’decisions are based on
the incumbent’s past performance and negative pieces of information have a
greater impact than positive pieces of information. In the light of the neg-
ativity eﬀect, Aragones (1997) obtains a result of systematic alternation of
the two parties implementing diﬀerent policies. In our analysis, there is no
uncertainty and electorate decisions are not based on past performance, but
as usually in political models, for their preferred party at each election. We
propose a simple model suggesting that political cycles can be generated by
inertia only.
2 The model
The constrained policy setting: Two candidates R and L compete in
an inﬁnite horizon repeated elections setting. The set of policies is the in-
terval P = [−1,1]. Each citizen is represented by a bliss point b αi in the
set of policies and voters bliss points are distributed over P. according to
the cumulative distribution function F. The utility function of voter i is de-
ﬁned over the set of eﬀective policies, U (b αi,pt) = −|b αi − pt| where pt is the
2eﬀective policy at time t. We suppose that candidates programs are ﬁxed.
Candidate j proposes a policy zj.
Policy inertia: We suppose that a policy implemented at date t has
an inﬂuence on the eﬀective policy at date t + 1. Let pt+1 be the eﬀective
policy at date t + 1. We suppose this policy results from the government
policy at date t + 1 and from the eﬀective policy at date t. Let δ ∈ [0,1]
be the ”inertia” degree of past policies. Let zW(t+1) denotes the program
implemented in period t + 1. The eﬀective policy at date t + 1 is then:
pt+1 = (1 − δ)z
W(t+1) + δpt,
In the case without policy inertia (δ = 0) there is no linkage between
the successive elections. In the second polar case with full policy inertia
(δ = 1), the policy is completely ﬁxed and voting has no inﬂuence on the
policy implemented. In the following, we will consider that δ < 1. Between
the two polar situations, a new government will have to face an inertia force
δpt, which can be interpreted in many ways.
Although the preferred eﬀective policy of a voter is ﬁxed, his preferred
program changes from an election to the following. To illustrate the dynamic,
let compute voter i preferred program (noted pi




b αi − δpt
1 − δ
,
Then, the more the eﬀective policy of the previous period was leftist, the
more the median voter will move to the right, and the more the eﬀective
policy of the previous period was rightest, the more the median will move to
the left. This intuition underline the swing of the voters.
Policy history: We suppose that the ﬁrst election take place in period
1, the inﬂuence of period 0 depend on a degree of inertia δ0 not necessarily
equal to δ and a past policy p0. These parameters can represent diﬀerent
histories. For example δ0 = 0 could refer to a revolution preceding the ﬁrst
democratic election in t = 1 and be interpreted as the fact that past policy
is completely removed.
3 Political Cycles
We say that the set of parameters (δ, b αm,zL,zR) exhibits Political cycles if no
party can win the elections an inﬁnite consecutive number of times, formally:
3Deﬁnition 1 A set of parameters (δ,p0, b αm,zL,zR) ∈]0,1[×[0,1]3 exhibits
Political cycles if and only if W (W(t) ∈ {L,R}}) does not converge when
t goes to inﬁnity.
A ﬁrst important remark, is that in situations where the median voter
is indiﬀerent between the two policies, the dynamic strongly depends on the
randomized winner. Indeed, if the median voter is indiﬀerent between the
two parties in election t, he will not be indiﬀerent in election t + 1. Let vm
t
be the utility of voter m over the set of programs at date t:
v
m
t (z) = u
i ((1 − δ)z + δpt−1),
The following result is straightforward at the light of the previous remark.
Lemma 2 zm











Hence, the situation where the median voter is indiﬀerent between both
parties cannot be stable in the long run. Now we characterize the set of
parameters such that political cycles appear:
Proposition 3 The set of parameters (δ,p0, b αm,zL,zR) exhibits Political cy-
cles if and only if 1−δ
1+δ ≤ zR−b αm
b αm−zL ≤ 1+δ
1−δ. , W converge to L if and only if
1+δ
1−δ < zR−b αm
b αm−zL, and W converge to R if and only if zR−b αm
b αm−zL < 1−δ
1+δ.
Proof. Suppose 1+δ
1−δ ≥ zR−b αm
b αm−zL ≥ 1−δ
1+δ.
step 1: Suppose that W converge to L. Then, there exists an election k such
that ∀t ≥ k, W (t) = L. This is implies ∀t ≥ k,
 pm
t+1 − zL  ≤

















= 0. Finally, lim
t→+∞pt+1 = zL. Now, we must
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4Which is equivalent to:
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Contradiction.
step 2: Suppose that W converge to R. Then, there exists an election k
such that ∀t ≥ k, W (t) = R. This implies ∀t ≥ k,
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Then W (t) converge to L.
Finally, suppose zR−b αm
b αm−zL < 1−δ







































Then W (t) converge to R.






parties alternate in power. Indeed, if party L is the incumbent, he will
necessary loose one future election. Then R wins the power and he will
necessary loose one future election, and so on...
We have claimed that the dynamic can take two diﬀerent paths when the
median voter is indiﬀerent between L and R. Indeed, suppose the median








. Since zR 6=
zL, we have pm
t = zL+zR
2 . Now we compare the case where L wins the election
to the case where R wins the election.
If L wins the election, pt = b αm + (1 − δ) zL−zR
2 . If R wins the election
pt = b αm + (1 − δ) zR−zL
2 . Then the dynamic can change dramatically.
4 Conclusion
We have proposed a simple inﬁnite horizon dynamic model of repeated elec-
tions where candidates have ﬁxed programs and policies present some degree
of inertia. We have shown that inertia can generate political cycles.
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